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Global deregulation of current and capital account is often touted as successful means
to reduce poverty and inequality. On the face of it, though, the evidence does not support
this claim. Rising intra-country inequality is widespread, income inequality between
countries grows, the absolute number of people living in poverty increases, and poverty
rate reductions are geographically isolated. Critics of global deregulation have charged
that more deregulated trade flows result in a worse income distribution and unregulated
capital flows in more macro economic instabilities that are especially harmful to the poor.
Using data from the World Bank, the IMF and the UN, we test the impact of increased
deregulation on the incomes of the poor. Our results indicate that global deregulation of
trade and capital markets does hurt the poor. We find that the income share of the poor is
generally lower in deregulated and in macro economically less stable environments,
which are more prone to occur after capital account liberalization. The evidence also
suggests that trade flows in more regulated environments may be good for growth and, by
extension, for the poor in the long-run.1
I. Introduction
Recently, a number of policy makers touted the potential for global economic
integration to combat poverty and inequity. For instance, World Bank researchers
claimed that globalization “reduces poverty because integrated economies tend to grow
faster and this growth is usually widely diffused” (Dollar and Collier 2001: 1).
Others, however, cast doubt on this benign view of global liberalization. In particular,
the evidence indicates that successful reductions in poverty and income inequality remain
elusive in most parts of the world at the same time that trade and capital flows have
become more integrated due to current and capital account deregulation.
Evidence of the trends in global poverty and inequality tends not to support the stance
taken by proponents of the global liberalization agenda. Gains in poverty reduction over
the previous two decades, if any, were relatively small and geographically isolated. The
number of poor people rose from 1987 to 1998, and the share of poor people increased in
many countries; in 1998 close to half of the population were considered poor in many
parts of the world. Moreover, the numbers show that income inequality between and
within countries increased along with deregulation of trade and capital markets. In 1980,
median income in the richest 10 percent of countries was 77 times greater than in the
poorest 10 percent; by 1999, that gap had grown to 122 times. Inequality has also
increased within a vast majority of countries.
A closer look at the relationship between economic openness, growth and poverty
reduction reveals that one of the main differences in the interpretation of the evidence lies
in the time frame of reference. In particular, those in favor of liberalized trade and capital
flows focus on the long-run, often ignoring short-term fluctuations that are especially
harmful to the poor. Moreover, some of the previous studies used data only through the
early 1990s, when the last round of trade and capital liberalizations e.g., through the
introduction of the World Trade Organization (WTO), had not taken place. In
comparison, we study the short-term impacts on the poor from greater liberalization of
trade and capital flows through the end of the 1990s. In addition, we analyze whether any
short-term costs are offset by long-term gains.
Our results indicate that global deregulation of trade and capital markets does hurt the
poor. We find that the income share of the poor is generally lower in deregulated and in
macro economically less stable environments, which are more prone to occur after capital
account liberalization. The evidence also suggests that trade flows in more regulated
environments may be good for growth and, by extension, for the poor in the long-run.
II. Measuring “Globalization”
An overview of the existing literature illustrates that the empirical results that are
often used to support increased global liberalization may not necessarily be robust. In
particular, the definitions of global liberalization are subject to scrutiny as are the
selection of countries and the time frames employed in previous analyses.2
A key problem lies in the difficulty of gauging economic openness. While research
has focused on defining openness in terms of statutory measures as well as on the actual
flows of trade and capital across national borders, these approaches suffer from a host of
problems (Rodriguez and Rodrik 1999; Eichengreen 2001).
Some problems associated with measuring openness can be found in the research
conducted by the World Bank. Recent World Bank research
1 looks at the effects of
increasing international integration of production, consumption and investment on
developing countries, measured in the level of international trade and capital flows
relative to GDP. This research makes a two-step argument supporting the view that
globalization tends to benefit the poor, first showing that an increasing level of trade is
good for economic growth and second that the benefits of this growth tend to be
distributed equally throughout different income levels over long periods of time (Dollar
and Kraay, 2001a, 2001b).
Implicit in this approach is the assumption that changes in trade volumes are
attributable to changes in trade policy (Dollar and Kraay, 2001b).  But such a leap from
the notion that integration is good to the notion that openness is good because it will lead
to integration is problematic. Trade volume alone indicates only a policy outcome, not a
policy choice for development. It is clear that “some markets appear more integrated
[based on flow variables] than one would expect on the basis of statutory restrictions”
imposed by nation-states (Eichengreen 2001). Moreover, the trade-volume approach
tends to ignore possible causes of increasing trade other than changes in trade policy such
as reduced transportation costs and growing world demand. As Rodriguez and Rodrik
(1999) note, while purporting to answer the question, “Do countries with lower policy-
induced barriers to trade grow faster,” the volume measures actually answer a
qualitatively different question, “Does growth of trade raise economic growth rates?” The
latter question offers little insight into the policy choices facing developing countries.
The second step of the two-step argument examines the distribution of income to the
poor relative to the rest of society. In the long run, Dollar and Kraay (2001a) find a one to
one relationship between the share of income accruing to the bottom quintile relative to
the top quintiles. It should be no surprise that in the long run the shares of growth are
distributed equally across all income levels. If the elasticity of income growth of the poor
with respect to overall income growth were anything but one, in the long run the poor
would either receive unrealistically low or high shares of total income.
To address the problems included in using trade volumes to measure openness,
Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995)
2, in perhaps the most comprehensive study of
economic openness to date, combined a detailed institutional analysis of the history of the
latest wave of global economic integration with empirical tests. They deem an economy
to be open when none of the following characteristics hold true: (1) non-tariff barriers
covering more than 40 percent of trade; (2) average tariff rates of 40 percent or more, (3)
                                               
1 Dollar and Collier (2001) provide a thorough review.
2 Hereafter referred to as SW.3
black market premiums of 20 percent or more for the 1970s or 1980s decade, (4) a
socialist economic system, or (5) a state-monopoly on major exports. Using this
classification, they find that open economies tended to grow faster.
While this study is often held as a benchmark for understanding the growth effects of
economic openness, it suffers from a number of problems. First, as SW themselves note,
it is difficult to disencumber the effects of trade and capital market deregulation from
other economic reforms such as price liberalization, budget restructuring, privatization
and deregulation that inevitably comprise a comprehensive program of reform.
Accepting that, for a moment, Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) ask which component
policies of the SW index explain the association of openness with growth. By breaking
apart the openness index that SW use, Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) test the effects of its
individual policy components on growth. Their findings show that black market premia,
which implies that foreign exchange restraints act as a trade barrier, and the existence of
state monopolies over exports, which reduce the level of trade, explain the association of
openness with growth. Meanwhile regime type, tariff rates and non-tariff barriers have
insignificant effects on growth. Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) also find that the state
export board variable poses a selection bias (it is highly correlated with the regional
variable for Africa) and that the black market premia variable is a bad indicator of trade
policy since it is more closely related with macroeconomic imbalances attributable to
other failed policies, political conflict and external shocks.
Second, just because an economy is open does not mean that it will integrate with the
rest of the world. In a review of cross-country studies of capital market integration, Barry
Eichengreen (2001) cautions “there can be no presumption that capital will flow into uses
where its marginal product exceeds its opportunity cost.” Likewise for trade: just because
a country reduces trade barriers does not mean it will export more.
Third, SW examine the effect of openness on growth in the period 1970-1989, yet
most countries in their sample did not open their economies until the 1980s or 1990s.
Twenty countries in their sample opened their economies between 1989 and 1994 and
others only opened at the end of the period under examination. Since it is widely held that
economic integration and the transition to openness may take “a couple of decades or
more” (Dollar and Kraay 2001b), it is unclear that, with such a lag, the growth effects
SW observe for those countries opening in the 1980s result from economic openness. In
the time since the publication of SW, deregulation of trade and capital markets has
become nearly universal, with membership in the WTO totaling 144 countries. With such
a pervasive shift to liberalized economic policies, it is worth examining how well SW’s
findings hold for different time periods and for other countries.
III. Deregulated Trade and Capital Flows, Inequality and Poverty
We address some of the shortcomings of earlier research in this paper. In particular,
we control for both trade volumes and institutional design. Second, we extend the
research to include the later part of the 1990s. Third, we analyze both the short-term and4
long-term effects of openness and trade on the poor. In particular, based on the existing
literature we would expect that global liberalization of capital and current accounts are
harmful to the poor in the short-run, but that there may be offsetting effects in the long-
run thanks to higher economic growth rates.
Over the past decades international capital mobility has grown as capital controls
were reduced or eliminated virtually everywhere. Consequently, capital flows to
developing countries grew rapidly from $1.9 billion in 1980 to $120.3 billion in 1997, the
last year before the global financial crisis, or by more than 6000 percent. Even in 1998, in
the wake of the global financial crisis, capital flows remained remarkably high at $56
billion. A substantial share of these capital flows, e.g. 36% in 1997, were short-term
portfolio investments (IMF, 2001b).
Faster capital mobility in a more deregulated environment can lead to rising
inequality in the short and medium term, both within countries and between countries,
and to less poverty reduction or even increasing poverty.
The probability of financial crises in developing countries rise in direct relation to
rises in unregulated short-term capital flows (Weller, 2001; Easterly and Kraay, 1999;
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1999). More short-term capital inflows result in more
speculative financing, thereby increasing financial instability. Financial crises reduce the
likelihood for the poor to escape poverty through economic growth because they are ill
equipped to weather the adverse shocks of macro-economic crisis (Bannister and Thugge,
2001; Lustig, 2000, 1998). Financial crises lower short-term growth rates, and it is
estimated that for every percent decline in growth, poverty increases by 2 percent (Lustig,
2000). Developing countries are prone to experience more severe economic crises with
greater frequency than developed economies (Lustig, 2000; Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal,
1996), leading to more inequality between countries.
The burdens of financial crisis are disproportionately borne by a country’s poor
(Baldacci, de Mello and Inchauste 2002). Since higher income earners have better access
to insurance mechanisms that protect them from the fallout of a crisis (including capital
flight), macro economic crises lead to a more unequal income distribution within
countries (Lustig, 2000; Townsend 2002). Many studies that examine the impact of
financial crises on the poor likely understate the true hardships suffered by low income
households during times of crisis. Frankenberg, Smith and Thomas (2002) find that many
people are forced to reallocate household budgets away from spending on schooling and
healthcare, to change their living arrangements, and to liquidate their assets in order to
smooth consumption during a crisis.
At the same time that economic crises increase the need for well functioning social
safety nets, unfettered capital flows limit governments’ abilities to design policies to help
the poor when they need it most—in the middle of a crisis. The IMF often opposes
increased government expenditures to assist the poor in the hardships of economic crisis,
and investors withdraw their funds following increasing government expenditures5
(Blecker, 1999). The poor are the first to lose under such fiscal contractions and the last
to gain when crises subside and fiscal spending expands (Ravallion, 2002).
Trade liberalization—the complement to deregulated capital markets—also plays a
significant role in raising inequality and limiting efforts at poverty reduction. By inducing
rapid structural change and shifting employment within industrializing countries that
liberalize, trade leads to falling real wages and declining working conditions and living
standards (Bannister and Thugge 2001; Mishel, et. al. 2001; Ocampo and Taylor 1998;
Taylor 1996). While critics of the view that trade liberalization has led to increasing
inequality often contend that a more significant cause of inequality lies in skill-biased
technological change, Feenstra and Hanson (2001) have shown that in fact skill-biased
change can result from trade liberalization. Measuring the relative size of these effects,
therefore, becomes an empirical rather than a theoretical issue.
Removal of trade barriers parlays into lower tariff revenues for developing countries.
For example, tariffs generated roughly 40 percent of India’s tax revenues through much
of the 1980s (Dutt and Rao, 2000). Restructuring tax regimes to offset lost tariff revenues
takes time and introduces administrative costs. Even if trade liberalization were growth
enhancing in the long-run, in the short-run revenue shortfalls may seriously constrain a
government’s ability to maintain spending on social services that benefit low-income
households.
Trade liberalization also gives teeth to employers’ threats to close plants or to relocate
or outsource production abroad—where labor regulations are less stringent and more
difficult to enforce—and undermines worker attempts to organize and bargain for
improved wages and working conditions (Bronfenbrenner, 1997, 2000). This trend fuels a
race to the bottom in which national governments vie for needed investment by bidding
down the cost to employers (and livings standards) of working people.
The connection between rapid trade liberalization and inequality is wide spread,
indicating downward wage pressures and rising inequality following trade liberalization
in industrializing and industrialized economies (USTDRC 2000). A report by UNCTAD
(1997) found that trade liberalization in Latin America led to widening wage gaps, falling
real wages of unskilled workers (often more than 90 percent of the labor force in
developing countries) and rising unemployment.
IV. Poverty and Inequality Trends
The World Bank recently released a rather comprehensive report on globalization and
poverty (Dollar and Collier 2001a) lauding the profound impact of increasingly
deregulated trade and capital markets in reducing global poverty and inequality.
However, the report shows that income inequality between and within countries increased
along with deregulation of trade and capital markets. The report, though, raises two issues
that supposedly mute the fact of rising intra-country inequality. First, data for China
dwarfs observations for all other countries, thereby suggesting that rising inequality in
globalizing countries does not exist outside of China (Dollar and Collier, 2001: 47).6
However, data for other countries show that growing inequality is indeed a widespread
trend. Second, the World Bank also claimed that rising inequality is not a result of
increasing poverty, and thus presumably less troubling (WB, 2001a: 48). While this claim
may hold true in China, it does not describe the trend in many other parts of the world.
There is a broad consensus that income inequality has risen in OECD countries since
1980. The World Bank reports that there was a “serious…increase in within-country
inequality [in rich countries] reversing the trend of [the period 1950-1980]” (Dollar and
Collier 2001: 46). Similarly, Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997:636) found that “almost all
industrial economies experienced some increase in wage inequality among prime aged
males” in the 1980s and early 1990s. Further, data from the Luxembourg Income Study
(LIS, 2001) show that among 24 countries, 18 showed increasing income inequality, five
(Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland) showed declining
inequality; and one (France) saw no change.
Income inequality is also rising in industrializing countries. There has been an
unambiguous rise in inequality in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s (Lustig and
Deutsch, 1998; IADB, 1999; UNCTAD, 1997; ECLAC, 1997). Other areas also saw
inequality rise in the 1980s and 1990s (Faux and Mishel, 2000; Chen and Ravallion,
1997). Deininger and Squire (1996) found rising inequality in East Asia, Eastern Europe,
and Central Asia since 1981, and growing polarization in South Asia. Only sub-Saharan
Africa shows a trend towards more income equality since the 1980s.
While a widening gap between the rich and the poor within countries is not universal,
it appears to have occurred at least in the majority of countries, and is affecting the
income of the majority of people around the globe.
Aside from a widespread increase in inequality, there are also signs that poverty
reduction has not been particularly widespread. The World Bank argued that “the long
[term] trends of rising global inequality and rising numbers of people in absolute poverty
have been halted and perhaps even reversed” (Dollar and Collier 2001:49). However, the
purported success in poverty reduction is elusive: the number of poor people is on the
rise, relative poverty shares remain high in many parts of the world, and poverty shares
are rising in many regions.
In assessing global poverty trends, the World Bank relies on a study that highlights
the World Bank’s Global Poverty Monitoring database and provides an overview of
poverty trends from 1987 to 1998 (Ravallion and Chen, 2001). The authors themselves,
though, conclude that “[i]n the aggregate, and for some large regions, all…measures
suggest that the 1990s did not see much progress against consumption poverty in the
developing world” (Ravallion and Chen, 2001:18). Also, The IMF (2000, IV:1) reports
that “[p]rogress in raising real incomes and alleviating poverty has been disappointingly
slow in many developing countries.”7
The assessment of poverty trends by the World Bank suffers from several problems.
A due consideration of the issues shows that the case for poverty reduction due to more
deregulated capital and trade flows does not stand up to scrutiny.
First, measuring poverty is a difficult undertaking. Different measures of poverty
exist. The World Bank’s Global Poverty Monitoring database, for example, uses an
international poverty line of $1.08 per day in 1993 dollars based on purchasing power
parity (PPP) exchange rates (Chen and Ravallion, 2001; WB, 2001b). But absolute
poverty lines, such as this one, ignore regional or country-by-country differences.
By using the international poverty line, the share of people living in poverty is
probably being understated. Using national poverty lines instead of the international
poverty line, we find that on average an additional 14 percent of the population is
considered poor (WB, 2001b). An alternative to both the national and international
poverty line methods is to use a relative poverty line based on mean consumption or
income levels in each country. Using such a relative poverty line instead of the
international poverty line, however, shows on average an additional 8 percent of the
population to be considered poor (Chen and Ravallion, 2001).
Second, even the poverty reduction gains that the World Bank reports are small and
geographically isolated. In 1998, the share of the population living in poverty in
industrializing countries was 32 percent using the relative poverty line. Although that
percentage was down from 36 percent in 1987, the actual number of people living in
poverty increased from 1.5 to 1.6 billion. In 1998, the share of the population in poverty
remained very high in some regions: 40 percent in South Asia, 50 percent in Sub-Saharan
Africa, and 51 percent in Latin America (Chen and Ravallion, 2001). Since 1987, the
share of the poor stayed constant in Sub-Saharan Africa, rose slowly in Latin America,
and more than tripled in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
Third, since the data do not extend beyond 1998, the full impact of the crises in Asia,
Latin America, and Russia is not included, which makes it likely that future revisions will
show less progress in poverty reduction. Lustig (2000) argues that frequent
macroeconomic crises are the single most important cause of rapid increases in poverty in
Latin America. Consequently, future revisions to the poverty trends in the late 1990s
could show smaller average reductions or larger increases in the crisis stricken areas.
Revisions to past data already show less success in poverty reduction than previously
assumed. Chen and Ravallion (2001), for example, show that the reduction of people
living below the poverty line between 1987 and 1993 was not 4 percentage points, as
estimated in 1997 (Ravallion and Chen, 1997), but less than one percentage point.
Finally, the conclusion that the lot of the poor has improved with increasing trade and
capital flow liberalization relies substantially on data from China and India. The facts in
both of these countries undermine the case for a connection between greater deregulation
and falling poverty and inequality. In 1995, SW deemed China a closed economy and
China only signed on to the WTO late in 2001. While in China the percentage who are
poor has fallen, there has been a rapid rise in inequality (WB, 2001a). Most notably,8
inequality between rural and urban areas and provinces with urban centers and those
without grew from 1985 to 1995. Claims to poverty reduction in China rely on rising per
capita incomes spurred by rapid economic growth and stable population size. However,
recently, some have questioned whether China’s are exaggerated (Rawski, 2001);
consequently, so too would China’s successes in poverty reduction be exaggerated.
Despite any gains, a large number of China’s workers labor under abhorrent, and
possibly worsening, slave or prison labor conditions (USTDRC, 2000; DoS, 2000, 2001).
Thus, improvements in China are not universally shared, and leave many workers behind,
often in deplorable conditions.
Using India to illustrate the benefits of unregulated globalization is equally
problematic since India’s progress was accomplished while remaining relatively closed
off from the global economy. Total goods trade (exports plus imports) was about 20
percent of GDP in 1998, or 10 percentage points less than in China, and only about one
fifth that of such export oriented countries as Korea (IMF, 2001a). Moreover, that the
IMF (1999, 2000) continuously recommends further liberalization of India’s trade and
capital flows - the only large developing economy for which this was the case - suggests
that the IMF viewed India as a laggard in deregulating its economy.
The arguments on changes in income inequality between countries take a few
perspectives. The World Bank’s assertion that “between countries, globalization is mostly
reducing inequality” (Dollar and Collier 2001: 1) seems to contrast directly the IMF’s
assessment that “the relative gap between the richest and the poorest countries has
continued to widen” in the 1990s (IMF, 2000, IV:1).
The distribution of world income between countries grew unambiguously in the
1980s and 1990s (Table 1). The median per-capita income of the world’s richest ten
percent of countries was 77 times that of the poorest ten percent of countries in 1980, 120
times in 1990, and 122 times in 1999. The ratio of the average per capita incomes shows
a similar, yet more dramatic increase.
The distribution of world income across people, rather than countries, witnessed some
improvement in equality in the 1990s after a dramatic increase in inequality during the
1980s. Regardless of the measure used, the distribution of world income grew
increasingly more unequal in the 1980s. While the ten richest percent of the world
population had on average incomes that were 79 times higher than those of the poorest
ten percent of the world population in 1980, their incomes were 120 times higher in 1990.
Despite slow improvements in the 1990s, the ratio of the average incomes of the richest
ten percent of the world’s population changed only marginally from 118 in 1990 to 117
in 1999. The improvement in equality in the 1990s was somewhat more pronounced
when using the ratio of median incomes instead of average incomes (Table 1). Even
under the different measure, the distribution of incomes was remarkably more inequitable
in 1999 than at the beginning of the period in 1980.9
But, the gains in the 1990s come solely from rising incomes in China. If China is
excluded, there is an unambiguous trend towards growing income inequality across the
remaining world population in the 1980s and 1990s (Table 1). Without China, the richest
ten percent of the world population had on average 90 times as much income as the
poorest ten percent in 1980, 136 times in 1990, and 154 times in 1999. However, since
China’s income distribution has become substantially more unequal in the 1990s,
including China’s per capita GDP in the distribution of world income across all people
exaggerates improvements in the world’s income distribution in the 1990s.
V. Empirical Analysis
From the discussion in the previous section, three hypotheses are apparent. First,
more deregulated trade flows are likely to hamper income growth at the bottom, and
hence help to perpetuate if not to increase poverty and inequality. Put differently, it is not
trade per se, but rather unregulated trade flows that are harmful to the poor. Second,
greater capital account liberalization results in greater financial and macro economic
volatility. And people at the bottom of the income scale are more likely to be adversely
affected by increased macro economic instabilities since they do not have the same
insurance mechanisms that higher income people have. Consequently, capital account
liberalization is harmful to the poor since it raises macro economic instability. Third, both
current and capital account liberalization are more likely to be harmful to the poor in the
short-run than in the long-run. In comparison, the poor may benefit from increased
growth from more trade in a more deregulated environment.
In this section, we test whether greater current and capital account liberalization
adversely affect the poor in the short-run. We first need to decide on an appropriate
measure for the incomes of the poor. We choose the share of income accruing to the
poorest 20% as the dependent variable. This measure has several advantages. First,
national poverty lines are not comparable across countries since each country uses its
own methodology. Second, absolute poverty lines, such as the $1-a-day line used by the
World Bank can possibly lead to misleading results if the distribution of income is very
steep near the poverty line. In this case, distribution-neutral effects will lift a large
number of people above the poverty line, without changing relative standards of living.
Third, absolute, time-invariant poverty lines pose a problem in that they do not account
for changes in the living standards of the poor. Fourth, the share of income accruing to
the poorest 20% is also a short-term measure for the difference between average incomes
and average incomes of the poor. Since we are interested in analyzing whether the poor
are systematically and adversely affected, at least in the short to medium-term, by current
and capital account liberalization, this measure seems appropriate
3.
                                               
3 Previous research (Dollar and Kraay, 2001a, 2001b) analyzed the long-term relationship between average
incomes and average incomes of the poor, and found, not surprisingly, that they tend to grow at the same
rate over the long run. The alternative hypotheses that the poor are either benefiting more from or regularly
falling behind average income growth seem unreasonable in the long run and across many countries since
they would imply that unrealistically high or low levels of income would be received by the bottom 20%.10
To arrive at the share of income of the bottom 20% we proceed in several steps. First,
for a number of countries we are able to obtain figures for the share of income accruing
to the poorest 20% after 1970. We use the UN-WIDER World Income Inequality
Database V1.0 (UN-WIDER, 2000) as our primary data source for income shares and
Gini coefficients. Second, we add observations on income shares and Gini coefficients
from the World Bank’s Global Poverty Monitoring Database (2001b). Third, where
income shares do not exist outright, we calculate them from the Gini coefficients
4.
The data set compiled in this manner is a panel of unbalanced and irregularly spaced
observations. To avoid that our results are determined by a few countries where many
observations are available, we select a subset of observations in the following manner.
Since we are interested in seeing how the poorest fared in developing countries, we do
not include developed countries. Furthermore, we include observations only after 1970.
First, we filter by the unit of analysis by giving preference to surveys of households
rather than individuals. Second, we select observations on the basis of income definitions
used by prioritizing gross income over expenditures over net income. Third, we select all
observations that are based on surveys that cover a country’s entire population. Our
fourth filter is the area covered by household surveys, whereby observations based on
rural or urban areas only are deleted in favor of observations that are based on surveys
covering entire countries. Fifth, we filter observations that cover all age groups, rather
than just a subset. Sixth, following Dollar and Kraay (2001a), we delete observations
such that observations for one country are spaced at least 5 years apart. Last, we select
observations on the basis of surveys with the largest sample size.
To test the impact of deregulation on the income share of the poorest 20% in
developing countries, we estimate the following regression equation:
it it it X IS e b b + + = 2 1 20 (1)
where IS20 is the income share of the bottom 20% determined by a set of
independent variables, X, and e is a randomly distributed, unrelated error term.
In general, a country’s income distribution is determined by a number of factors. For
one, a rise in income inequality is often associated with a skill-biased technological shift,
whereby workers with a certain set of skills see their incomes rise faster than everybody
else’s. In turn, if the share of formal skills obtained through schooling and other training
are more widely dispersed, income inequality should fall. Hence, we include the share of
people enrolled in secondary education as an explanatory variable, which should be
positively associated with the share of income accruing to the poor.
                                               
4 Assuming that income is lognormally distributed, and the Gini coefficient is calculated on a scale from 0
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1  (Dollar and Kraay, 2001a).11
Second, income inequality can also be influenced by a set of institutions that raise or
lower income inequality. Such institutions include government support, which we proxy
by including the ratio of government consumption expenditures relative to GDP.
Assuming that higher government consumption expenditures translate into better social
safety nets, this ratio should be associated with a greater income share for the poorest
20%. Similarly, to control for the allocation of government resources we include a
measure of political freedom since previous research has found that in more democratic
societies, people express a desire for more redistribution. Hence, more democracy should
also be associated with a larger income share for the poorest 20%.
Further, to control for current account deregulation, we include two different
measures of trade openness. Our preferred measure is the composite openness calculated
by SW since it captures actual policy variables. Noting the shortcomings of this measure
as discussed above, we decide to use it for two reasons. First, it is preferable to a pure
volume measure for openness. Second, we can extrapolate the composite openness
measure under reasonable assumptions, but not its components.
In addition, we consider the widely used trade ratio of exports plus imports relative to
GDP. Although this measure offers a glimpse at a country’s participation in the
international trade regime, it does not provide any information on the institutional design
under which international trade occurs. However, our argument in the previous section
pertains exactly to this issue since more deregulated trade, and not more trade per se, is
expected to result in rising inequality. Consequently, we would expect that our openness
variable has a negative sign, while our trade variable has no effect on the incomes of the
poor in the short-run. Finally, we include measures of macro economic stability since
greater liberalization is associated with more instability that hurts the poor. More macro
economic volatility thus should result in lower income shares of the poor
5.
To test the impact of greater deregulation on the poor, we estimate regression
equation (1). Our results indicate that greater deregulation are harmful for the poorest
20%, and that trade by itself, after controlling for the institutional environment, has no
direct effect. Regression (1) in table 2 shows our results using OLS. In particular, all
explanatory variables have the expected sign or are insignificant, with the exception of
our political freedom variable. Greater deregulation and less schooling lower the income
share of the poor, as does more political freedom. If we allow for random effects in our
panel, the results remain largely robust as regression (2) shows. The only notable
exception is that the macro economic volatility now has also a negative impact on the
share of income of the poor. If we used fixed effects instead of random effects, both
freedom and school enrollment no longer have statistically significant effects, as shown
in regression (3). Only our openness and macro economic instability variables have
significant and negative effects on the income share of the poorest 20%. Lastly, we
include regional dummies for Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East in
regression (4). Again, only openness and macro economic instability have significant and
negative effects on the income share of the poorest 20%.
                                               
5 See the appendix for a detailed list of variables, definitions and sources.12
Our macro economic instability measure deserves further attention. It is possible that
the five-year standard deviation of the real growth rate does not fully reflect actual
instabilities since financial crises may affect economic growth with a lag or only by
depressing average growth rates. Consequently, we use a currency crisis index in addition
to our macro economic instability variable to measure short-term fluctuations. Currency
crises are reflected either in rapid currency devaluations or in quickly depleting official
reserves or both. Hence, the index is a weighted average of the rate of change of the
exchange rate, De/e, and of reserves, DR/R, with weights such that the two components












A measure three standard deviations above the mean is classified as a currency crisis.
Years during which a currency crisis occurs are set equal to one and all others equal to
zero. We then average over the five years up to and including the current time period.
Consequently, our variable is equal to the likelihood of a currency crisis occurring during
the previous five years.
We present regression results using the currency crisis index as additional
explanatory variable in table 3. Our openness variable has a consistently negative effect
on the share of income of the poorest 20%. In addition, there is some evidence that
education has a positive effect. But there is little evidence that financial crises have an
effect on the poor per se. In other words, it seems that only after financial crises translate
into macro economic instabilities, the poor are being hurt.
Further, it is likely that our results may be influenced by our choice of time period.
Since we are interested in short-term changes in the incomes of the poor, we analyze
whether the choice of shorter time period averages for our explanatory variables impact
our results in a substantial manner. The regression results in table 4 show that our
previous results are largely robust. Openness has a generally negative effect on the
income share of the poor, although it is not as robust as in the previous regressions.
Similarly, greater macro economic instability adversely affects the poor. In addition,
democracy by and large adversely affects the income share of the poor. As Przeworski
and Limongi (1993) observe, capitalist democracies provide “two mechanisms by which
resources can be allocated to uses and distributed among households: the market and the
state.” The dynamic tension between the power of the state and market to determine the
distribution of resources mean that democracies may be slow to empower the less
wealthy. Barro (1999) found that democracy increases with the share of income accruing
to the middle class. In other words, there may be a chance that more income is accruing
to the middle class, and less to the bottom, or the top, for that matter.
Our regression results indicate that more current and capital account liberalization
hurt the poor. This is not because trade is directly harmful for the poor, but because of the
institutional design under which trade is conducted. In particular, trade in a more13
deregulated environment lowers the income share of the poor, whereas trade in a more
regulated environment raises the share of the poor. Specifically, since the estimated
coefficient for our openness variable is between 0.6 and 1.0 in most cases, an increase in
international deregulation over the past 5 years by one standard deviation, 0.45, reduces
the share of income going to the poorest 20% by 0.3 to 0.5 percentage points. Assuming
that international deregulation is a linear process, this is equivalent of saying that opening
an economy almost half way lowers the share of income of the poor by an amount equal
to 4.6% or 7.6% of the average share of income of the poor, 5.9%, in our sample.
While the poor are hurt in the short-run, they may benefit in the long-run from global
liberalization. The poor seem to benefit proportionately from stronger growth in the long-
run (Dollar and Kraay 2001a). Consequently, if current account liberalization is
beneficial for growth, the relative losses of the poorest 20% in the short-run may be offset
by faster income growth for the poor in the long-run
6.
Consequently, we test whether current account liberalization has a positive effect on
long-term growth rates using a standard long-run growth model. In general, economic
growth is hypothesized to enable economic convergence: countries with lower initial
incomes were expected to grow faster than countries with higher initial incomes. To
address the fact that the world is still characterized by non-convergence (Romer, 1986),
the concept of conditional convergence was ultimately developed (Barro and Sala-I-
Martin, 1992, 1996). Under conditional convergence countries differ in their own long-
run per capita income levels. Hence, each country tends to grow faster the greater is the
gap between its initial per capita income level, yi*, and its own long-run per capita
income level, yi:
) * ( i i it y y y - = b & (3)
A positive value of b is said to signal conditional convergence. Since the long-run
per capita income level is unknown, it is proxied by certain structural variables, Zji, such
as initial levels of human capital. Consequently, the estimation equation becomes:
) ( i ji ji it y Z y - S = g b & (4)
Hence, a negative coefficient on initial income signals convergence after proxying for
each country’s long-run per capita income levels.
As dependent variable, we choose the average growth rates for 20-year periods. For
one, we are interested in seeing whether there is potentially a trade-off for the poor
between short-term costs and long-run gains. Also, our time frame is long enough to
avoid economic bubbles that often arise from deregulation euphoria in the years
following liberalization (Arestis and Demetriades, 1999; Weller, 2001). Hence, using
                                               
6 In addition, we could imagine including capital account liberalization as a factor impacting growth.
However, most measures for capital account openness, such as foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows
relative to GDP, are only available on a limited basis. We return to this further below.14
shorter time periods may yield misleading results if they capture short-term bubbles,
instead of long-term growth patterns
7.
Our dependent variable is the average growth rate of the real local currency per capita
GDP for available 20-year periods. This allows us to use more recent data than earlier
studies have, which seems particularly pertinent since full liberalization only occurred in
the late 1980s and early 1990s for many developing and transition economies.
In choosing our explanatory variables, we follow numerous other studies, but we have
to contend with some data restrictions as we expand the time horizon. Thus, we include
initial secondary school enrollment, average government consumption expenditures,
average private and public investment, average democratic development, and initial
population density in addition to initial income levels. Our expectation is that higher
human capital endowment, more investment, more democracy, and a greater population
density will result in more growth, ceteris paribus. In comparison, higher government
consumption expenditures are expected to lower long-run growth.
We subsequently add variables for openness and trade to the regression. In particular,
we deem countries open if they were open for the entire period under investigation. But
this distinction classifies countries that were open for most of the period as closed.
Consequently, we alternatively use the 20-year average of the openness index as
explanatory variable. Since we are interested to see whether current account deregulation
per se has an effect on growth, we include the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP as
control variable.
Table 5 shows that the hypothesis that openness is beneficial for growth in the long-
run finds no robust support. First, we follow Sachs and Warner (1995) and estimate a
simple convergence model where long-run average growth is determined solely by initial
income. Similar to their findings, we find no evidence for convergence as the estimated
parameter is insignificant. Once we split the sample into open and closed economies, the
parameter estimate for open economies – regression (3) – suggests convergence, whereas
the results for closed economies – regression (2) – do not. Sachs and Warner (1995) used
similar findings to draw the tentative conclusion that more openness can help to explain
convergence. Next, we expand the regression model to include additional variables that
are typically included. Regression (4) is added as a reference point since it includes many
of the variables typically added to long-run growth regression, such as government
consumption, public and private investment, the initial population density and a measure
for political freedom. All variables have the expected signs or are insignificant.
We subsequently add various measures of openness and trade integration to the
reference model. Regressions (5) through (8) show that openness and trade integration,
either separately or together, do not have a measurable impact on long-run economic
growth. Similarly, democratic institutions and initial population density are consistently
negative, indicating that more democracy and lower population densities were good for
growth. In comparison, the variable that is largely robust is investment, indicating that
                                               
7 In fact our results further below support this notion.15
higher capital formation relative to GDP results in faster economic growth. Similarly,
there is some indication that more government consumption expenditures lowers long-run
growth rates. Finally, there is some indication that higher initial secondary school
enrollment will result in lower growth rates. This may be explained by a high correlation
coefficient of 0.73 between initial secondary school enrollment and initial income.
Our primary interest is the effect of openness on long-run economic growth. Using a
more medium-term frame of reference, such as 10-year average growth rates offers some
advantages. First, it allows us to see how sensitive our results are with respect to the
chosen time frame. Second, it permits us to test for differences over time, and third, we
can include additional variables, such as a control variable for capital flows.
Table 6 shows our results for 10-year average growth rates. The main finding is that,
although we observe some positive effects of openness on growth, these seem to
disappear over time. All explanatory variables have the expected sign or are insignificant.
The only explanatory variable that is consistently insignificant is the initial population
density. Regressions (2) through (4) use different measures for openness and trade
separately, and find in each case that openness or trade is beneficial for growth.
Regression (5) includes openness and trade together and finds that both variables are
positively related to growth.
Some observers have pointed out that the impact of deregulation has slowed growth
over time. Consequently, we control for changes over time by dividing our sample into
half
8. The break point hence is 1994. In other words, the first sample spans all 10-year
periods ending before or in 1994, whereas the later sample covers all 10-year periods
ending after 1994. Regressions (6) and (7) show that openness and trade have a positive
impact on growth prior to 1994, but not afterwards
9. Furthermore, we can now add a
measure for foreign direct investment (FDI) to our regression to control for capital
account movements in addition to current account trends. The results in regressions (8)
through (10) show that openness has only a positive effect during periods prior to 1994,
but not afterwards and neither for the entire sample. Since the estimates for the two
sample periods are significantly different, our regression results show little support for
the hypothesis that global deregulation is good for growth.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we look at the short-term and long-run effects of global liberalization on
the poor in developing economies. Our results indicate that more current and capital
account liberalization hurt the poor. This is not because trade is directly harmful for the
poor, but because of the institutional design under which trade is conducted. In particular,
trade in a more deregulated environment lowers the income share of the poor, whereas
                                               
8Absent other verifiable break points, this methodology appears to be soundest. Choosing decades instead
seems rather arbitrary since it would divide the sample into a subperiod with the vast majority of
observations, the 1990s, and a subperiod with only few observations, the 1980s.
9 An F-test for the equality of the parameters for both subperiods rejects the null hypothesis that they are
equal at the 1%-level with a calculated F-statistic of 8.10 and 52 and 453 degrees of freedom.16
trade in a more regulated environment raises the share of the poor. The short-term effects
on the income share of the poor is not offset by faster income growth in the long-run. Our
results indicate that global deregulation has no measurable, robust impact on growth
rates. Thus, there does not appear to be a trade-off between adverse effects in the short-
run and long-run benefits for the poor.
However, our results also indicate that trade and possibly capital flows may have a
beneficial effect on growth in the long-run, and no systematic adverse effect on the
income share of the poor in a regulated environment. Hence, greater trade and capital
mobility in a regulated environment, as was the case for the majority of countries for
most of the sample period, appears to be a preferable development choice. More research,
though, is needed to identify exactly, which types of regulations are specifically well-
suited to reap the benefits from trade and capital flows, while letting the poor share in the
gains in the short-term and in the long-run.17
Table 1
Distribution of world income, ratio of top 10% to bottom 10%
1980 1990 1999
By countries
      Ratio of average incomes 86.2 125.9 148.8
      Ratio of median incomes 76.8 119.6 121.8
By population
      Ratio of average incomes 78.9 119.7 117.7
      Ratio of median incomes 69.6 121.5 100.8
By population, excluding China
      Ratio of average incomes 90.3 135.5 154.4
      Ratio of median incomes 81.1 131.2 153.2
Note: Distributions are based on per capita GDP in current U.S. dollars (IMF 2001a).
Source: Author's calculations based on IMF (2001a, 2001b).18
Table 2









































































Country Dummies No No Yes No
N 144 144 144 144
Adj. R-squared 0.15 n.a. 0.79 n.a.
Wald Chi-squared n.a. 17.83*** n.a. 47.16***
Notes: All independent variables are five-year averages up to and including the present time period. LSDV indicates least squares with
dummy variables. * indicates significance at the 10%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, and *** indicates significance at
the 1%-level.19
Table 3

















































































Country Dummies No No Yes No
N 144 144 144 144
Adj. R-squared 0.171 n.a. 0.788 n.a.
Wald Chi-squared n.a. 17.81*** n.a. 47.20***
Notes: All independent variables are five-year averages up to and including the present time period. LSDV indicates least squares with
dummy variables. * indicates significance at the 10%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, and *** indicates significance at
the 1%-level.20
Table 4

















































































Country Dummies No No Yes No
N 155 155 155 155
Adj. R-squared 0.148 n.a. 0.79 n.a.
Wald Chi-squared n.a. 14.89** n.a. 49.62***
Notes: All independent variables are five-year averages up to and including the present time period. LSDV indicates least squares with
dummy variables. * indicates significance at the 10%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, and *** indicates significance at
the 1%-level.21
Table 5



























































































































F-test for all country dummies 21.59*** 15.27*** 258.43 14.33*** 12.55*** 11.15*** 12.68*** 10.51***
N 94 80 14 94 94 94 94 94
Adj. R-squared 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.23
F-statistic 1.99 0.12 147.45*** 3.68*** 3.18*** 3.13*** 3.40*** 2.91**
Notes: All independent variables are five-year averages up to and including the present time period.* indicates significance at the
10%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, and *** indicates significance at the 1%-level.22
Table 6

































































































































































































































F-test for all country
dummies
23.61*** 21.58*** 20.92*** 21.11*** 17.17*** 15.82*** 22.15*** 19.67*** 16.75*** 26.80***
N 510 510 510 510 510 254 256 346 174 172
Adj. R-squared 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.47 0.28 0.45 0.60 0.46
F-statistic 28.37*** 25.33*** 25.86*** 26.59*** 23.75*** 22.47*** 9.91*** 26.23*** 21.24*** 26.80
Notes: All independent variables are five-year averages up to and including the present time period.* indicates significance at the
10%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, and *** indicates significance at the 1%-level.23
Appendix
Table A-1










Government consumption (national accounts
basis) divided by GDP, both in current local
currency.
(IMF 2001a, 2001c)
Democracy Annual Survey of Freedom. (Freedom House
2001)
Freedom Annual Survey of Freedom. (Freedom House
2001)
Openness Sachs and Warner's "Background on Country





Sum of exports and imports of goods and
services (national accounts basis) divided by





Gross fixed capital formation divided by GDP,
both in current local currency.
(IMF 2001a, 2001c)





Monthly, period-ending local currency per
U.S. dollar exchange rate and monthly total














Income shares and shares imputed from GINI






Logarithmic average growth rate. (IMF 2001c)24
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